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A Trusting Public: How the Public Trust Doctrine Can Save the New
York Forest Preserve
By: Katherine R. Leisch
“Wilderness is not a luxury but a necessity of the human spirit”
– Edward Abbey
New York – a place the eyes of the world are always upon, it seems.
While people know many of the state’s accomplishments, it is likely
that not as many think of it as a leading example in environmental law
and conservation. As early as 1894, however, New York raised the
environmental bar globally by enacting the first “wilderness” law.1 At
the 1894 Constitutional Convention New Yorkers took a firm
conservationist stance by creating what is now Article XIV 2 of the New
York State Constitution, which stated:
The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter acquired,
constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law,
shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. They shall not
be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any
corporation, public or private, nor shall the timber
thereon be sold, removed or destroyed.3

1

Nicholas A. Robinson, “Forever Wild”: New York’s Constitutional Mandates to
Enhance the Forest Preserve, 7 Pace Law Faculty Publications (2007), available
at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/284.
2
It was originally Article VII § 7, but the quoted text has remained the same.
3
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV § 1.
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These words, unprecedented in 1894, have remained the strongest
preservation law in the United States. 4 They were groundbreaking in
1894, but in fact they were taken from an even earlier New York law,
which was enacted in 1885.5 It was this decision to put the
aforementioned state law into the constitution that makes the “forever
wild” law so important.
Article XIV ensures the protection of this wilderness in perpetuity,
in effect solidifying the forest preserve as a part of the public trust.
Furthermore, the public trust is something that predates the States in
a way that makes it virtually indestructible. Therefore, Article XIV
serves as a limitation on government in order to protect the forest
preserve through the safeguards of the public trust. No branch of
government, nor constitutional convention can destroy the public trust,
including the Forest Preserve.

I. Introduction to the Public Trust
In order to better understand the weight behind the public trust
doctrine, some history is in order. The public trust doctrine is one of
the strongest legal doctrines in the United States even though it is less
black letter law than other laws. This is partly due to its lengthy

4

Robert C. Glennon, State Acquisition in the Adironodacks: The Inconsistent
Purpose Doctrine and Related Legal Issues, Presented to the Colloquium on
Historic Preservation Issues in the Adirondack Park 1 (1982).
5
The Forest Preserve was created by statute: L1985 c. 283 sections 7 and 8.
Robert C. Glennon, Non-Forest Preserve: Inconsistent Use, in THE ADIRONDACKS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TECHNICAL REPORTS VOL. 1 74, 75 (1990).
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history, traceable as far back as the Roman Empire. 6 It found its way
into ancient English common law and the Magna Charta, and from
England, like much of our legal system, it came to America. 7 The way
this doctrine has been woven into laws throughout history is what
makes it so strong and fundamental, and is the reason why the people
trust it to always be there.
While surely the general concept of the public trust dates back much
further, the beginning of its codification occurred in 529 A.D. when
Emperor Justinian began compiling and codifying Roman law. 8
Justinian law stated, “the following things are by natural law common
to all – the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the seashore.”9 These things were deemed res communes and every person
had an equal right to them, including a right to prevent others’ uses
from interfering with his right.10 Thus a doctrine was born, and it
continued to grow, adapt, and spread throughout other areas.
The most notable adoption of this concept for our current legal
system was England’s Magna Charta. Although neither the Magna
Charta nor its predecessor were as comprehensive as our modern

6

Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 471 (1969-1970).
7
Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles,
14 U.C. Davis L. Rev 185, 185 (1980); see Mark Dowie, In Law We Trust: Can
Environmental Legislation Still Protect the Commons?, ORION MAGAZINE (July
2005), available at http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/articles/article/122/.
8
Paul Halsall, MEDIEVAL SOURCEBOOK: THE INSTITUTES 535 CE (June 1998)
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/535institutes.html.
9
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle, D.C.L. trans., 1883, Oxford 5th ed.
1913).
10
WILLIAM A HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 57-58, (5th ed. 1897).
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doctrine, it was an important step in the right direction. 11 It essentially
made the King “trustee for the public rights, but he could not
appropriate them to his own use.”12 This strengthened the public trust
doctrine by making it impossible for the King to destroy; this is why the
public trust doctrine is seen as a limitation on government.
Similar to other laws in the early United States, the public trust
doctrine, as an English law, was part of the American legal system
from the beginning. As such it was something New York retained as
sovereign when it seceded from England.13 Later, when New York
joined the Union the duties and obligations of this doctrine continued to
be reserved to the state. Therefore New York has always retained the
power of the King under this doctrine, and is accordingly bound by the
limitations placed on such power.14 Just as the King could in no way
destroy or diminish the public trust, nor can New York destroy or
diminish the public trust.

II. The Power of the Public Trust – No One Can Destroy It
As demonstrated, the public trust doctrine wields great power. Due
to the fact that the public trust doctrine comes to New York from the
common law in effect before New York was a state, it carries a lot of

11

Note, Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, YALE L.J. 762, 768 (1970).
12
Id. at 769.
13
See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 382 (1842).
14
See id. at 416 (referring to New Jersey, but the doctrine of equal footing
supports the conclusion that all states entered the union with the same rights and
principles, and therefore the conclusion applies equally to New York).
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weight when looking at what the state can and cannot do. As
mentioned, the common law public trust was a limitation on the power
of government. Therefore, neither New York’s legislative nor executive
branches can diminish the public trust in any way, and in fact that is
exactly what the doctrine intends to prevent.
In New York common law is followed unless otherwise legislated.
One way to preserve the rights of common law so that courts are
incapable of changing the law is to put them into the State constitution,
such as the Framers did with the fundamental rights. This is what the
1894 Constitutional Convention did with the Forest Preserve,
effectively taking it out of the judiciary’s reach also.
Taken as a whole, therefore, the public trust of the Forest Preserve
cannot be destroyed by any branch of government. This principle is
supported by case law. The court in People v. Baldwin, for example, in
an adverse possession claim against the state for lands within the
Forest Preserve, found that what the case turned on was whether the
lands in question were held by the State for proprietary reasons or held
by the State as sovereign in trust for the public. 15 Finding the latter to
be true, the court held that the State cannot “lose such lands as it holds
for the public in trust.”16 Baldwin also points out that the Forest
Preserve was placed in the public trust before the constitutional

15
16

People v. Baldwin, 197 A.D. 285, 288 (N.Y. 1921)
Id.
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provision,17 and this illustrates the purpose of the Forest Preserve. The
court elucidated its holding by stating, “these lands are forever
reserved for the Forest Preserve and that no power exists on the part of
the Legislature or of any officer or department of the State to dispose
of, or in any manner deprive the People of their title to the lands.”18
This is extremely powerful language supporting the reasoning stated
above.
Further support of the perpetuity of the public trust can be found in
Illinois Central.19 There the court states:
[t]he sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot,
consistently with the principles of the law of nature and
the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct
and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting
all the citizens of their common right. It would be a
grievance which never could be long borne by a free
people.’ Necessarily must the control of the waters of a
state over all lands under them pass when the lands are
conveyed in fee to private parties, and are by them
subjected to use.20
Illinois Central also recognizes that the public trust is present in every
state. The equal footing doctrine, allowing all states to have the same
17

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Id. at 290 (citing People ex rel Turner v. Kelsey, 180 N.Y. 24, 26 (1904)).
19
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, (1892) (the court was
required to determine whether the State could give away land it held in trust for
the public).
20
Id. at 456.
18
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rights and level of sovereignty as the original colonies, further supports
this principle.21
When examining the public trust it is important not just to look at
what the doctrine prohibits but also at what it requires. The public
trust doctrine makes the government the trustee for the people. This
duty is essentially no different than any other trustees’ duties. At the
very least, this means that the state cannot alter it in a material way,
which will be addressed further subsequently. At the most however,
when examined in terms of Article XIV, it “embodies an affirmative
mandate to enhance the Forest Preserve.” 22 Both of these requirements
of the state as trustee support the principle that the state cannot
destroy the public trust and therefore cannot destroy the Forest
Preserve.

III. The Forest Preserve is Public Trust
After looking at the functions and mandates of the public trust
doctrine, it logically follows that it should be determined whether the
Forest Preserve is protected by the public trust. The answer to that is
a resounding yes, a position that is well supported by case law. The
most obvious parallel comes from the most traditional application of
public trust, through navigable waters within the Adirondack and
Catskill State Parks, both public and private. It applies more

21
22

72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Etc. § 19 (2010).
Robinson, supra note 1, at 8.
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comprehensively, however, as parkland, and further on its own merits
as Forest Preserve.
As introduced above, the public trust doctrine originated as a
protection of waterways for navigation and other public uses.
Historically this was said to be protecting the waters which ebb and
flow with the tide. Case law effectively demonstrates that this has
evolved to now include all navigable waters, including those within the
parks. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,23 the court explained
that English common law had defined the navigable waters to which
the public trust applied, as those which were subject to the ebb and
flow of the tides was based on the facts of English geography, not
necessarily the purpose or state of the law. The court went on to hold
that “the same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over . . . the
navigable waters of the Great Lakes applies, which obtains the common
law [of coastal waters] and that the lands are held by the same right . .
. and subject to the same trusts and limitations.” 24 This interpretation
expanded the way public trust was applied, and makes it clear that at
the very least it applies to the navigable water within the Adirondacks
and Catskills.
The doctrine’s application to these parks was made clearer and more
encompassing by the decision of Adirondack League Club v. Sierra

23

24

See supra note 19.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 437 (1892).
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Club.25 Here, in determining whether kayakers have a public right to
use water flowing through private land, the court reasoned: “Pursuant
to the public trust doctrine, the public right of navigation in navigable
waters supersedes plaintiff's private right in the land under the
water.”26 Therefore, “the public's right to navigate includes the right to
use the bed of the river or stream to detour around natural obstructions
and to portage if necessary.”27 This effectively said that not only does
the public trust apply to waterways in the parks, and the Forest
Preserve, but also to waterways and shoreline within private lands. 28
The doctrine has also been determined to apply more broadly to
New York parklands. One of the many examples of case law supporting
this assertion can be found in Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of
New York, where the court, in determining what could be done by the
State with parkland, held that “[i]n the 80 years since Williams, our
courts have time and again reaffirmed the principle that parkland is
impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before it

25

201 A.D.2d 225 (N.Y. 1994).
Id. at 232.
27
Id.
28
In demonstrating this concept of the public trust applying to seemingly all
waters within the Adirondack and Catskill park, it may be important to note that
not only are both parks the primary source for numerous watersheds, but the
Adirondack park alone has over 30,000 miles of rivers and streams, over 300,000
acres of surface water, and over one million surface acres of aquifers (Daniel
Kelting & Corey Laxon, Review of the Effects and Costs of Road De-icng with
Recommendations for Winter Road Management in the Adirondack Park,
Adirondack Watershed Institute Report # AWI2010-01 (Feb. 2010)). Further
analysis of this concept is beyond the scope of this paper.
26
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can be alienated or used for an extended period for non-park
purposes”29
However, if these corollaries seem dissatisfactory, there is still more
support that the public trust doctrine applies directly to the Forest
Preserve. In an interesting case, which carefully examines the history
of the Forest Preserve, the court states very precisely that
[t]he Forest Preserve is preserved for the public; its
benefits are for the people of the State as a whole.
Whatever the advantages may be of having wild forest
lands preserved in their natural state, the advantages
are for every one within the State and for the use of the
people of the State. Unless prohibited by the
constitutional provision, this use and preservation are
subject to the reasonable regulations of the
Legislature.30
The court in the MacDonald case, simply by looking at the history,
points out that the purpose of the 1894 Constitutional Convention was
to assure that these state lands were public trust lands. This is
supported further by purposes behind the Forest Preserve to protect
the watershed,31 and the 1892 law establishing the Adirondack park:
“… to be forever reserved, maintained, and cared for as a ground for the

29

95 N.Y.2d 623, 750 (2001).
Ass’n for Prot. of Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 253 N.Y. 234, 238 (1930).
31
ALFRED S. FORSYTH, THE FOREST AND THE LAW 12 (Sierra Club, et al., pub.
1970).
30
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free use of all the people, for their health or pleasure, and as forest
lands necessary to the preservation of the headwaters of the chief rivers
of the state.”32

IV. Can New York State Expand Public Trust Limits to New
Land?
The concept of adding land to the Forest Preserve is built into
Article XIV where is states “lands now owned or hereafter acquired,” 33
but is this legitimate when adding lands to the Forest Preserve equals
adding land to the public trust? As discussed previously, the state
cannot diminish the public trust in anyway because it is in the role of
trustee; however, there are certainly no prohibitions on adding land to
the trust, and as also already mentioned, it can be said that there is in
fact a mandate on the state to improve the Forest Preserve in such a
way.34 One example supporting this expansion of the public trust is
supported is in the Mono Lake case, National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court. 35
The Mono Lake case was an important precedent in public trust law,
because the injury that was occurring was to the surrounding
ecosystem. There the Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc,
discussed the flexibility of the public trust and therefore the

32

Ch. 707, L. 1892.
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
34
See generally, Robinson, supra note 1.
35
33 Cal.3d 419 (1983).
33
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acceptability of adaptation by broadening the uses deemed protected
under the doctrine.36 They then went on to hold that the public trust
doctrine can be invoked for environmental conservation reasons and
also that it protects nonnavigable tributaries because they affect the
navigable waters already included in the public trust.37 This expanded
the boundaries of the public trust in order to effectively protect more for
the public. The court was sure to remind the state of its limitations
under the doctrine by stating: “no one could contend that the state
could grant tidelands free of the trust merely because the grant served
some public purpose, such as increasing tax revenues, or because the
grantee might put the property to a commercial use.”38 These holdings
are very easily applied to the New York Forest Preserve as public trust.
What this means in terms of the Forest Preserve is that as New
York purchases or acquires land within the parks it is capable of
expanding the boundaries of what is protected by public trust.
Furthermore, this case reminds readers of the fact that once land is in
the public trust it is there forever; the State cannot simply remove it
regardless of any claim that it is in the public interest to do so.
However, this is an area that quickly becomes confusing in regards to
the Forest Preserve and will receive further attention below.

36

Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 437.
38
Id. at 440.
37
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A. How land is added to the Forest Preserve 39
There are a number of ways which the state may acquire land. For
example, the state may acquire it through gift or devise, through
condemnation or foreclosure, or it can just be bought. Article XIV
Section 1 includes the key phrase, “now owned or hereafter acquired,”
requiring that when the state acquires land within the “blue line” 40 it
be added to the forest preserve and therefore to the public trust. There
was also general encouragement for the state to acquire more land for
the Forest Preserve, as Delegate McClure urged at the outset of the
constitutional convention debate: “the state should acquire all the
forest lands in the Adirondacks and Catskils.”41 The principle of
acquiring more land for the forest preserve was supported by a number
of the delegates of 1894, including Floyd, McIntyre, and Brown. 42
Once the state acquires new land in the forest preserve counties
either or both (depending on location) the APA and DEC are
responsible for its management. As such it obtains a classification to
manage it more specifically. According to the State Land Master Plan
(SLMP), the land is to be classified as soon as possible, and at the most,
within a year.43 Both the master plan for the Adirondacks and the

39

The history of adding land to the Forest Preserve is far more involved than
discussed here, and deserves closer attention, but it is beyond the scope of this
paper.
40
I.e.; the boundaries of the Adirondack and Catskill Parks.
41
Glennon, supra note 5, at 77.
42
See id. at 77-78.
43
Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan [APSLMP] (2001), at 8.
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Catskills advise that the state should only be acquiring lands that
would be considered Forest Preserve.44
However, the SLMP triggers further constitutional scrutiny. It
classifies the lands within the Adirondacks and Catskills for different
uses and management practices based on a number of factors.45 This
begs the question: just how many categories of wilderness can there be
before it is no longer the “forever wild forest lands” the Constitution
requires? It is apparent upon reading both SLMPs with an eye towards
the intentions of our 1894 Constitutional Convention delegates that the
APA and the DEC are between a rock and a hard place with these
plans.46 The agencies must uphold the mandates of the Constitution,
including “forever wild” and “for the free use of all the people,” in a
time where the use and enjoyment by the people includes many things
not pondered by the framers. How much mechanized access do you
allow? Do you provide the types of facilities that generally make for a
cleaner environment (i.e. restrooms, and campgrounds), or keep the
appearance wild without as much sanitation control? As trustee for the
people the state is required to maintain and improve the public trust,
but how much “maintenance” of wilderness defeats the purpose of
wilderness itself? This paper is not prepared to answer all of these
44

APSLMP supra note 37, at 6; Catskill Park State Land Master Plan [CPSLMP]
(2008), at 9
45
See generally, APSLMP, supra notes 37; see also, CPSLMP, supra note 38.
46
It is also apparent that they knew that when writing these SLMPs as both
contain a number of parentheticals or prefaces indicating that the provisions of the
SLMP in no way lend weight to the “constitutional appropriateness” of them, and
that said policy is such only “if [that policy is] constitutionally permissible.” See
APSLMP, supra note 37, at 6, et al.; see CPSLMP, supra note 38, at 12, et al..
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questions or decide the constitutionality of every provision in both
SLMPs; however one conclusion I am prepared to draw is that all forest
preserve land should be afforded equal protection under Article XIV,
and to allow otherwise is just as unconstitutional as a failure to provide
all citizens equal protection under the U.S. Constitution. One example
of this shortcoming can be found in the Adirondack Park SLMP’s “wild
forests” classification, which does not provide for the same Article XIV
protection (contrary to the “wild forests” of the CPSLMP 47), and allows
for silviculture (including practices that are a clear violation of Article
XIV).48
B. Inconsistent Uses
Inconsistent uses or purposes are perhaps the biggest concern when
it comes to acquiring new land in the forest preserve. Since 1912 the
inconsistent purpose doctrine, an amorphous non-legal argument, has
been used to allow the state to acquire lands in Forest Preserve
counties without putting them into the Forest Preserve even though the
Constitution and Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) mandate
their addition to the Forest Preserve. The doctrine in its current form
and how it has been used in the past is unconstitutional. There is some
argument to be made for its limited necessity, but if it is to have any
legal power it must be applied consistently, in accordance with some

47
48

See CPSLMP, supra note 38, at 38.
See APSLMP, supra note 37, at 32.
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rules, and must be properly adopted as a specific amendment to the
constitution.
The doctrine comes from a 1912 Attorney General opinion, and its
nefariousness is detectable from the beginning. The opinion essentially
states that if land is acquired by the state for an express purpose that
is inconsistent with constitutional mandates of the Forest Preserve,
those provisions should not be held to apply to newly acquired land,
and it will not be considered forest preserve.49 This is directly in
conflict with the ECL definition of forest preserve, which states: “The
“forest preserve” shall include the lands owned or hereafter acquired by
the state within the [counties enumerated]” 50 (emphasis added). This
language has been held by the court to be “clear and definite, and does
not in itself require construction,”51 and as such leaves no room for the
exceptions provided for in the Attorney General’s opinion.
Interestingly, the Attorney General’s opinion almost defeats itself
when looked at through the lens of the public trust. The opinion
supports itself by stating: “To hold that the state cannot use for prison,
asylum, memorial, and canal purposes the lands which it acquires for
such purpose … would … deprive the state of the right to the use of the
means ordinarily employed in exercising the functions of
government.”52 This, however, is actually what the public trust

49

1912 NY Atty Gen. Op. 104.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 9-0101(6) (McKinney 2010).
51
People v. Fisher, 190 N.Y. 468, 480, 83 N.E. 482, 486 (1908).
52
1912 AG Op, at 106.
50
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doctrine’s entire purpose is; it is meant to be a limitation on
government. Therefore the fact that the Forest Preserve was actually
created as something to be held in trust for the public means that some
limitations are placed on what the government can and cannot do. The
Attorney General was using this to support his creation of the
inconsistent acquisition doctrine, but in fact it explains one reason why
it is unconstitutional, because it gives the state more power than it can
have under the public trust.
A counter argument may be that reading the Attorney General’s
opinion closely, it does not say that the state may just apply this rule
any time it wants to. In listing the inconsistent uses of state land in
Forest Preserve counties, it lists things that are either historical or
serve a governmental purpose, such as jails, asylums, and hospitals.
Regardless of this quasi-restrictive language however, there are still
huge problems with this idea of inconsistent acquisitions. First, as
already stated, but worthy of emphasis, the inconsistent acquisition
doctrine clearly flies in the face of the public trust, the Constitution,
and the ECL. Second, although the Attorney General opinion seems to
argue that it cannot be used for simply any reason, the opinion is not
law, and as such offers no real protections for how it is used. Third,
although it is tempting to argue that some of these things are
necessary, the idea was not unheard of at the time of the 1894
Convention, yet was still not written into the Constitution or
accompanying law.

18
To elaborate on the latter point, the full definition of “forest
preserve” in the ECL provides:
The “forest preserve” shall include the lands owned or
hereafter acquired by the state within the county of
Clinton, except the towns of Altona and Dannemora,
and the counties of Delaware, Essex, Franklin, Fulton,
Hamilton, Herkimer, Lewis, Oneida, Saratoga, Saint
Lawrence, Warren, Washington, Greene, Ulster and
Sullivan, except:
a. Lands within the limits of any village or city;
b. Lands not wild lands and not situated within
either the Adirondack park or the Catskill park
acquired by the state on foreclosure of
mortgages made to loan commissioners; and
c. Lands acquired under the provisions of sections 90107 and 9-0501.53
What is significant about this in regards to the argument for allowing
inconsistent acquisitions is the phrase, “the county of Clinton, except
the towns of Altona and Dannemora” at the beginning. This phrase has
remained unchanged since it was contained in chapter 283, section 7, of
the laws of 1885, and the two exceptions contained therein are towns
where a prison had been constructed, and where land had been

53

N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 9-0101 (McKinney).
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purchased for wood supply for the prison.54 What this means is that
the creators of the forest preserve knew there were things, such as
prisons, that would be inconsistent with the purpose of the forest
preserve, and in recognition of this they carved out explicit exceptions
for them. Equally important is what they did not do, which was to
provide an exception for any future inconsistent uses. This set of facts
supports the inference that it was never the intention to allow for new
inconsistent uses or acquisitions, and even though it is not explicitly
stated that way, it is implied by what was and was not included in the
Constitution.
The unconstitutionality of inconsistent uses is further supported by
case law and the use of the public trust doctrine. The Friends of Van
Cortland Park case is an interesting example of the limits placed on
land protected under the public trust. In that case, the court
determined that even though the proposed improvement was a public
benefit,55 and the interference with the parkland would not be
permanent,56 it was still a sufficient enough interference and
inconsistent use that the State could not simply begin work on the
project without legislative approval. Seeing how this holding was
based on the public trust doctrine alone, it seems more than logical that
forest preserve inconsistent uses would be taken even more seriously

54

Glennon, supra note, 5, at 75.
Friends of Van Cortland Park, supra note 25, at 626. (The city was trying to
build a water treatment plant).
56
Id. at 631. (The construction process would only interfere for five years).
55
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because they are protected both by the public trust and the
Constitution.
Another important case to consider when looking at inconsistent
uses is Indian Lake v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment.57
This case stands for two things: that the Constitution is clear enough
for courts to overrule inconsistent acquisition, but also that due to New
York’s past indiscretions in allowing inconsistent acquisition doctrine to
slip through the cracks, continuing down the unconstitutional path, is
easily supported.
The Proceeding was brought seeking that the State Board of
Equalization and Assessment include two tracts of land, the Cascade
Lake Tract and the Salmon Lake Tract, in its approval list of taxable
state land.58 The court needed to decide if the two tracts of land were
“forest preserve” for tax purposes, because the pertinent tax law
required for “all wild or forest lands owned by the state within the
forest preserve” be taxed.59
Justice Koreman, sitting for the Supreme Court of New York,
Special Term, decided that the lands were definitely Forest Preserve
because they were stipulated as “wild or forest lands” 60 and were within
the counties listed in the definition of Forest Preserve.61 The court

57

45 Misc.2d 463, 257 N.Y.S.2d 301
Town of Indian Lake v. State Board of Equalization, 45 Misc.2d 463, 464, 257
N.Y.S.2d 301, 303-04 (Sup. Ct. N.Y Special Term 1965).
59
Id. at 465 & 303 quoting Real Property Tax Law, section 532.
60
Indian Lake, supra note 52, at 465.
61
Then cited as section 63 subdivision 1 of the Conservation law; now found at
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 9-0101 (McKinney)
58
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used the plain language of the statutes and the constitution to come to
its conclusion and found support from cases like Fisher and
Patenaude,62 both of which also use a plain meaning approach to
finding when land is protected by Article XIV. What Justice Koreman
failed to adequately address however was the concept of inconsistent
uses, and their constitutionality. The court mentioned the 1912
Attorney General’s Opinion in passing, 63 but did not discuss it at all
because it felt it addressed lands that were not wild or forest lands, and
the case at bar was for wild or forest land.
Then on appeal, the Appellate Division only partially upheld the
Special Term’s ruling. The court there went back to looking at the
purpose for which the land was acquired rather than what the law
says. Furthermore, although the concept of inconsistent uses was
extensively argued in both the appellant’s and respondent’s briefs, the
Appellate Court failed to discus this issue at all.
In an effort to take a closer look on this very important
Constitutional issue that has been overlooked for far too long, the
following will attempt to flesh out some of the pointed arguments made
by both sides on this issue.64

62

See generally, People v. Fisher 190 N.Y. 468 (1908), and People v. Patenaude,
286 App Div 140 (1955). Both cases in determing whether lands were in the
Forest Preserve found the statutory language clear that all lands acquired in those
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The appellants’ arguments go mainly toward the legislative intent,
and what they feel is the more sensible way of interpreting the statutes
and constitution. Appellants argue that because a private landowner
in a Forest Preserve county can use land inconsistently with the
“forever wild” provision it would be “absurd” to hold that the state could
not do the same types of things with its land. 65 This argument fails for
exactly the same reason as the similar reasoning in the 1912 Attorney
General opinion, because the Forest Preserve is part of the public trust,
and as explained, the point of the public trust is to limit what the
government can and can’t do with certain areas. Furthermore, the
argument is also invalid when simply looking at the purpose of the
Forest Preserve, regardless of its relationship to public trust because it
was still created in order to prevent the State from doing certain
activities on it.
The appellants go on to discuss the Attorneys General opinions of
1912 and 1957, both of which state that inconsistent acquisitions in
forest preserve counties are acceptable. The brief points out that no one
has challenged this rule,66 and they seem to use that as a
determination that nothing is wrong with it, but that is not necessarily
true.

Appellants’ brief pages 12-13); the issue being one of first impression and the
side-stepping other courts have done around it (see both briefs generally); the
referendum discussed in respondents’ brief (pages 22-23).
65
See Brief for Appellant at 14 Towns of Indian Lake v. State Board of
Equalization and Assessment, 26 A.D.2d 707 (N.Y. 1966).
66
Id. at 21.
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This is followed by their argument that the “Court should give
controlling weight to the practical interpretation of the Forest Preserve
provisions given and acted upon by the legislative and executive
branches.”67 Then their second point states that the statutes involved
are “amendatory” rather than “contradictory” of the Forest Preserve. 68
Both of these arguments overlook the fact that when it comes to the
Constitution, the legislative and executive branches don’t have the
power to change the terms on their own without an amendment, and a
statute created by the legislature is not equal to a Constitutional
amendment.
The Respondents had effective counter-arguments to these issues
raised by the appellants. First, they dismiss the “too restrictive”
argument by recounting the history of the construction of Article XIV
and the MacDonald case, stating it “was obviously what the framers of
the constitutional prohibition had in mind.” 69 Respondents also found a
great deal of support in other case law for their arguments even though
this exact issue has been skirted.70
The respondents go on to discuss the lack of the legislative power.
They preface this with by stating “this legislation is in error and in
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contravention of the Constitution,”71 and go on to explain, “it is beyond
the power of the legislature, or any officer or department of the State to
overcome the constitutional mandates.” 72 Respondents come back to
this issue in concluding their brief, and really strengthen this argument
further by stating:
The appellants’ position is that the legislature, in effect, can by
legislation amend the constitutional provision to delete the
words ‘or thereafter acquired’ . . . ‘no power exists on the part
of the legislature or of any officer or department of the state to
dispose of, or in any manner deprive the People of their title to
the lands.’”73
This also strongly harkens back to the idea of the public trust and the
protections provided therein, which is further emphasized by their
conclusion that “[i]f legislation can exempt lands from the
constitutional mandates then there is no reason why such lands cannot
be converted, used and sold precisely in the fashion … the
constitutional provisions were designed to overcome.”74 This is the
same argument for why legislature cannot alter the public trust of the
Forest Preserve. As part of this lack of legislative authority argument,
the respondents’ brief discussed the Attorneys General opinions
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74
Id at 21.
72

25
brought up by the appellants, and clearly conclude “[t]hey are directly
contrary to the clear language of the Constitution.” 75
If these two appellate briefs so clearly discussed the idea of
inconsistent acquisitions, and the past Attorneys General opinions, why
would the court fail to address any of these concerns? This paper
cannot begin to speculate on judicial discretion, but one possibility is
that the court understood just how spectacular the ramifications of
ruling on the constitutionality of this idea would be. It would require a
significant amount of post hoc action, and perhaps does not seem worth
the trouble to the court. Obviously the easiest decision to make in
regards to almost everything is to just let the chips fall as they may.
Which is why it appears to me that the best way to prevent this issue
for continuing to be ignored is to address this issue directly via the
constitution. Either by making amendments for the things that have
been allowed to slip through the crack and then “shutting the door” as
the framers intended, or by codifying clear and explicit rules about
what is and is not forest preserve. Perhaps an amendment as simple
as: when the state acquires land in the enumerate counties it is
automatically forest preserve land, subject to Article XIV, unless it is
acquired specifically for the purpose of, a jail, a hospital, a historic
monument, that is necessary for the public welfare.
It is also important to note that even though these inconsistent
acquisitions that allow state lands to be excluded from the forest
75
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preserve are unconstitutional, it would potentially be more harmful if
inconsistent uses were put in the forest preserve. While keeping some
lands out of the forest preserve is failing to uphold the mandate to
improve and expand the preserve, the latter possibility would be worse
in the sense that it would allow forest preserve land to not be “forever
wild,” and once land is in the preserve it is there forever. Allowing the
presence of these types of things weakens the entire principle of the
forest preserve and Article XIV. For those reasons, and for the reason
that we seem to have allowed this issue to fall too far down the slippery
slope, very narrowly tailored and strict rules need to be applied to
existing non-conforming uses, and to all future acquisitions, and the
appropriate amendments need to be made to allow for them.
It is the Legislature’s unwillingness to go through the amendment
process that is an ongoing weakness and unconstitutionality, which
must be remedied immediately. This may be most aptly exemplified by
the DEC’s lax attitude in granting past temporary revocable permits
(TRPs).
According to DEC’s own policies a TRP is a “permit for use of State
land which is temporary in nature and which will not result in an
unreasonable or permanent diminution of the natural values and
characteristics of such land.”76 Additionally, the policy states that
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Division of Lands and Forests, Temporary Revocable Permit Policy, N.Y.
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TRPs should last no longer than a year.77 These things did not stop the
DEC from granting a TRP to Central Hudson Gas & Electric for them
to build electricity distribution lines. DEC granted Central Hudson’s
request on December 8, 1947.78 The utility lines are on state land in
Ulster County, and have never been required to obtain the proper
constitutional amendment to allow for their presence. This is just
another example of an unconstitutional inconsistent use that should
never have been allowed to exist without an amendment to the
Constitution.
Not only are these types of inconsistent uses violations of the
Constitution but they are also contrary to public trust doctrine as
demonstrated by the court’s holding in Friends of Van Cortland Park.79
These are the reasons why it is necessary to create a very specific
statute or amendment that directly addresses inconsistent and nonconforming uses in the forest preserve. It has been proven time and
time again that the Constitution alone is not enough. Even though it is
clear and unambiguous what the Constitution requires, there have still
been allowances for unconstitutional occurrences due to a lack of
enforcement.

V. Navigating the Amendment Process
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Although amendments should be a way to strengthen Article XIV,
perhaps it occurs to some that the amendment process is simply a
tempting loophole, and the answer to their problem with the Forest
Preserve is to simply amend it away. This is not a valid or legal option,
and it is necessary to dispel this notion before the next Constitutional
Convention.
A Constitutional Commission is not granted any additional power; it
only has the power to do what the state can do. As previously
mentioned, the state does not have the power to destroy the public trust
due to the nature of the doctrine as a limitation on state power.
Furthermore, if a state were to remove the Forest Preserve from the
public trust it would imply that the state can remove anything from the
public trust, and if that were true there would be no doctrine at all.
This defeats the argument that you can diminish the Forest Preserve
without diminishing the public trust doctrine. Therefore an attempt to
repeal Article XIV and abolish the Forest Preserve is nowhere within
the reach of the Commission’s nor the Convention’s power.
A. Anti-Degradation
Anti-degradation or anti-backsliding is a principle of common sense.
If you work hard and make regulations and laws to improve something,
why would the same law makers want to allow progress to go
backward, or undo all of the work that has been done? Even though
this concept seems like it would be able to go unsaid, it has been
actually written into some statutes such as § 402(o) of the Clean Water
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Act, and the Clean Air Act § 172(e). It would be wise to not only
consider anti-backsliding when looking at proposed amendments, but
also to consider incorporating it textually the way these other
environmental statutes have done.
One example of the anti-backsliding concept being functionally
present in the forever wild clause, even if not expressly written in, is
the amendment process so far. As practiced, the amendment process
has included the principle of “land swaps,” or in other words, when
something is taken out, something else must be put in. This has a
similar effect functionally as an anti-backsliding clause would. It
allows flexibility and adaptation without degradation. Another
example is found in the way land classifications work in the parks. The
CPSLMP provides that “[r]e-classification of lands to a less restrictive
classification may only be accomplished by an amendment to, or
revision of, the [sic] this Plan.”80 While this is not quite as strong antidegradation language, it is a step in the right direction.
Part of the reason that it seems like anti-backsliding is in place for
Article XIV, even without explicit mention of it, is due to its place in the
public trust. As mentioned, the state has a duty as trustee to not allow
for any diminishment to the trust. This is why the amendments
contain land swaps, because not only would it be backsliding, but it
would also be a violation and diminishment of the public trust.
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Although, from the faults this paper has already taken note of, it
may seem like what has been done over time has been backsliding,
there is a difference between backsliding and actions in violation of the
Constitution and/or the public trust. For example, many of the actions
by the DEC have been “one step forward – two steps back” types of
movement; however, these actions are not authorized by Article XIV,
and were not in fact voted on specifically by the public. This is where
the other definition of trust comes into the public trust doctrine.
The Forest Preserve was put into the public trust so that it would
remain available to the public in perpetuity. Because changes to Article
XIV require the vote of the people, therefore changes to the use of the
land also require the people’s backing. Surely everyone knows the only
way for anything to be accomplished in a democracy is through
delegation, and the public trusts the people whom these tasks are
delegated to, to look out for their interests. The public trusts that their
delegates, their state, the trustee of their lands, will do what the laws
they voted on tell them to do. What the law says is “forever wild,” and
the law implies no backsliding; that’s what the public trusts them to do.
Although, based on the legal reasoning already discussed, an antidegradation law or amendment is not necessary to protect the Forest
Preserve, it wouldn’t hurt, and perhaps, looking at some of the actions
previously discussed, some would argue it’s needed. New York’s
constitutional “forever wild” provision places itself and New York in a
unique exemplary role. As one of the first of it’s kind it has set the
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precedent around the world for other governments to take the safety of
their local environment seriously. Governments across the globe,
including Russia, Italy, and Brazil, look to Article XIV, the
Adirondacks, and the Catskills as a role model. As a gold standard, the
State should never be permitted to degrade New York’s environmental
constitutional provisions. Even though as it stands now, the Forest
Preserve is protected from degradation by other means, perhaps that
won’t always be the case. If, for example, the next Convention leads to
higher standards in relation to the State’s protection of wilderness, it
would make sense from both the environmental standpoint and the
global policy standpoint to then prevent the standard from ever
slipping back down.

VI. Conclusions for a Constitutional Convention
There are a number of very important implications for a future
Constitutional Convention and Constitutional Commission, considering
that sound legal analysis concludes that the public trust doctrine not
only applies to the Forest Preserve, but also protects it by limiting
government action. The foregoing text supports this finding along with
the following restatement of the logical reasoning.
The public trust doctrine was instituted in England as a permanent
limitation on the powers of the Crown. The doctrine, being well
established, was brought to America and applied equally in the states.
As such, when New York (and others) seceded from England and
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became sovereign states the doctrine remained in place, meaning that
it remains as a permanent limitation on New York State’s sovereignty.
Therefore it is an indestructible check on government. Furthermore,
the Forest Preserve is part of the public trust, and is then privy to the
protection it provides. Logically it follows that the Forest Preserve is
also indestructible. The “forever wild” forest preserve is forever legally
protected.
What this means for any future Constitutional Convention is that an
attempt to diminish the Forest Preserve by any means, including trying
to weaken or repeal Article XIV or the “forever wild” clause, would be
beyond the scope of its authority. Even if such an action was pushed
through the political process, it would be immediately overturned in the
court of law.
On the other hand, if the proposals of the Convention went toward
effectively strengthening Article XIV, they would most likely pass
constitutional muster. They would of course have to abide by the other
laws of the state and constitution. However, as already stated, because
the state is essentially in the role of a trustee, it is required to act in
benefit of the trust.81 As such, any amendments of this kind would be
not only approved, but also encouraged.
Finally, the Convention should address the inconsistent use and
acquisition issues discussed previously, and also adopt an antidegradation clause. The latter is especially important if it is going to
81
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strengthen or expound upon the “forever wild” provision, so that
progress made in the immediate future cannot be undone down the
road. Although it seems that anti-degradation is implied by any
trust/trustee relationship, it is wiser to make it legally explicit.

